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A Mindful Environmental Jurisprudence?: 
Speculations on the Application of Gandhi’s 
Thought to MCWC v. Nestlé 
NEHAL A. PATEL & LAUREN VELLA* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Gandhi’s life and thought captured the imaginations of 
millions of people around the world.  His influence on civil 
disobedience campaigns and many social movements is well 
known.  He is best known for his application of non-violence to 
political and social conflict, particularly in the context of 
oppressed people resisting the will of an oppressor.  What is less 
often acknowledged, however, is Gandhi’s persistent attempt to 
create a comprehensive vision of the world that challenged both 
empirical and normative assumptions of modern institutions.  His 
eclectic blending of Indian philosophy, Buddhism, world 
mysticism, and Western social theory created a way of viewing 
self and society in such a way that functioned as an alternative to 
Western-only world views for the future of the planet and our 
species.  It is no wonder, therefore, that Gandhi has functioned as 
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an intellectual ally for many alternative critical thinkers over the 
past century, especially those who themselves have challenged 
oppressive social conditions. 
Given the revered status that so many attribute to him, it 
would be easy to assume that Gandhi has had a profound 
influence on dominant ways of thinking in law and jurisprudence.  
However, although Gandhi had much to say–and do–on these 
topics, his largest influences remain within the social movements 
of oppressed peoples as well as in counter-cultural movements.  
His thought today still exists on the margins of academic social 
theory, despite the fact that his name often is celebrated publicly 
by dignitaries around the world. 
In particular, Gandhi’s impact on jurisprudence is negligible.  
There is virtually no academic scholarship that speculates on a 
Gandhi-informed jurisprudence.  This is intriguing, given that 
Gandhi spent most of his adult life publicly challenging existing 
laws and filled hundreds of pages of commentary on people’s 
relationship to law.  He inquisitively examined people’s duties to 
both obey and resist laws.  Yet, strangely, jurisprudential 
scholars overwhelmingly are silent on the question of how to 
engage Gandhi.  He remains more of an admired figurehead of 
peace and non-violence rather than a serious source of legal 
theory in the mainstream of modern jurisprudence. 
We attempt to engage modern legal reasoning with Gandhi’s 
thought.  We hope to speculate on what jurisprudence would look 
like if it were more mindful of the concepts central to Gandhi’s 
thought.  By using Gandhi as an intellectual anchor, we hope to 
take a step toward creating a more “mindful jurisprudence” that 
implicitly incorporates into its reasoning the needs of 
environmental stewardship, disempowered populations, and the 
poverty-stricken.  Because Gandhi’s thought has been discussed 
at length in environmental justice campaigns, we begin this effort 
by examining the relationship between environmental law and 
Gandhi’s thought.  Given Gandhi’s commentaries on exploitative 
and oppressive social relationships, we focus on the intersections 
of law, environment, and economy. 
We use the recent suit, Michigan Citizens for Water 
Conservation v. Nestlé Waters North America, Inc. (MCWC), as a 
case study to which we apply themes from Gandhi’s thought.  
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/5
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Applying Gandhi’s thought to MCWC is useful for two reasons.  
First, MCWC contains several core legal doctrines that appear 
regularly in environmental cases (and in case law more broadly).1  
As a result, our applications of Gandhi’s thought directly apply to 
other environmental cases.  Second, the case involves a 
defendant-corporation’s encroachment onto a stream used by local 
plaintiff-civilians.2  Environmental justice campaigns often 
involve similar factual circumstances in which local people resist 
large outsider organizations.3  Therefore, using Gandhi’s thought, 
we examine the legal reasoning in MCWC to identify taken-for-
granted assumptions about environment and society that favor 
outside parties over local residents. 
A.  Gandhi’s Influence on Environmental Thought 
In the domain of environmental thought, Gandhi did not 
focus purely on parts of the physical environment such as wildlife 
or natural resources.4  Instead, Gandhi understood 
environmental problems through an emphasis on social 
relations.5  Therefore, to understand the implications of Gandhi’s 
view of environmental problems, it is important to understand his 
view of society.  We can explicate his world-view by examining his 
writings. 
Gandhi did not strive to write any complete treatise on his 
thought because he was concerned about addressing immediate 
 
 1. See Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., 
Inc. (MCWC), 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007), overruled by Lansing Sch. Educ. 
Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1996) (water contamination in 
Woburn, MA); A Brief Introduction to the Narmada Issue, FRIENDS OF THE RIVER 
NARMADA, http://www.narmada.org/introduction.html (last visited Mar. 18, 
2013) (discussing efforts against building a dam along the Narmada River); THE 
CORPORATION (Zeitgeist Films 1996) (water privatization in Bolivia involving 
Bechtel Corporation). 
 4. See Ramachandra Guha, Mahatma Gandhi and the Environmental 
Movement in India, in ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN ASIA 65, 114 (1998). 
 5. In this sense, Gandhi seems akin to many schools of environmental 
sociology. See ALLAN SCHNAIBERG, THE ENVIRONMENT: FROM SURPLUS TO 
SCARCITY (1980). 
3
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problems.6  As a result, Gandhi often wrote letters directly to a 
person or essays published to the public.7  His writing often 
contains both social commentary and appeals to readers to act 
upon the issues he raised, and they contain themes about what 
current environmental commentators would call sustainable 
production and consumption.8  For instance, Gandhi cautioned 
India to avoid the industrial production processes of the British 
Empire: 
God forbid that India should ever take to industrialism after the 
manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny 
kingdom (England) is today keeping the world in chains.  If an 
entire nation of 300 millions [sic] took to similar economic 
exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts.9 
Here, Gandhi noted how unsustainable production will “strip 
the world bare,” leading to environmental chaos.  In addition, he 
simultaneously acknowledged how the stripping of the physical 
environment is connected to exploitative social relations.  The 
exploitation of the poor is an environmental justice issue which 
Gandhi connected to resource conservation. 
Gandhi also addressed consumption as a key ingredient of 
sustainability.  Through his own example, he encouraged Indians 
to live simply and consume mindfully.10  One of his most well-
 
 6. MK GANDHI, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OR THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH 
TRUTH viii (1927); see also VENKATRAMAN SUBRAY HEDGE, GANDHI’S PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW (1977) (Revision of author’s thesis, 1983). 
 7. See MAHATMA GANDHI, COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE 
(1999), available at http://www.gandhiserve.org/e/cwmg/cwmg.htm. 
 8. Id. 
 9. GANDHI, September 10, 1928 - January 14, 1929, in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 412-13 (“[Factories] ought only to be 
working under the most attractive and ideal conditions, not for profit, but for 
the benefit of humanity, love taking the place of greed as the motive. . . . 
Therefore, replace greed by love and everything will come right.” GANDHI, 
August 16, 1924 - December 26, 1924, in COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI 
ONLINE, supra note 7, at 266-67); see also Guha, supra note 4, at 65. 
 10. See MAHATMA GANDHI QUOTES, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/show/ 
427443 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (Part of his ethic can be captured by the 
saying often attributed to him that “[t]here is enough in the world for everyone’s 
need, but not enough for everyone’s greed”); GANDHI, December 14, 1907 – July 
22, 1908, in COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 
207 (Gandhi also stated, “[o]ne should bear in mind that greed always begets 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/5
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known preferences was for middle-class Indians to buy locally-
made clothing (khadi or khaddar), which he also made with his 
spinning wheel.11  He is also famously known for living with only 
a handful of material possessions while in pursuit of larger 
spiritual and social goals.12  Gandhi’s mindful consumption and 
material simplicity challenge the dominant economic thinking in 
which the desire to consume is considered by many to be the 
economic engine of modern growth and often functions as 
justification for expanding markets.13 
In contrast to dominant economic theory, Gandhi did not see 
economic growth as an end in itself, and instead, focused heavily 
on the means by which social needs could be met.14  In other 
words, Gandhi held our intentions as a primary consideration in 
debating the social good.  Rather than using the desire to 
consume as a moral trump that justifies the production of goods, 
Gandhi balanced the desire to consume with the question of what 
and how to consume.15  Gandhi, therefore, uncompromisingly 
inserted the requirement of a moral calculus into all economic 
considerations.16  In contemporary economic discourse, economic 
theorists often treat moral questions as being external to 
economic reality and therefore completely disregard moral 
 
sin”); GANDHI, July 22, 1921 – October 25, 1921, in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 416 (“Our non-co-operation is neither 
with the English nor with the West. Our non-co-operation is with the system the 
English have established, with the material civilization and its attendant greed 
and exploitation of the weak. . . . Our non-co-operation is a refusal to co-operate 
with the English administrators on their own terms. We say to them, ‘Come and 
co-operate with us on our terms, and it will be well for us, for you and the 
world.’”). 
 11. AJIT K. DASGUPTA, GANDHI’S ECONOMIC THOUGHT 25-30 (1996). 
 12. See generally LOUIS FISCHER, GANDHI: HIS LIFE AND MESSAGE FOR THE 
WORLD (1982) (The back cover explains the influence of Gandhi’s simplicity and 
a photograph of Gandhi’s scarce possessions). 
 13. See MAHATAMA GANDHI, HIND SWARAJ AND OTHER WRITINGS (Anthony 
Parel ed., 1997). 
 14. DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 21-30, 121-22. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. at 21-30 (discussing “ethical preference” to describe Gandhi’s 
inclusion of normative judgment into consumption).  I adopt the terms "theory of 
trusteeship,” “theory of rights,” and “critique of industrialization" from 
Dasgupta. 
5
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consideration.17  However, the huge gulf between moral 
philosophy and modern economics that pervades Western thought 
was non-existent in Gandhi’s thought: economic behavior and 
moral decision-making occurred in the same human beings and 
therefore went hand-in-hand.18 
In terms of its environmental consequences, a call to exercise 
moral decision-making has been a method to change consumption 
patterns.  Gandhi often associated environmental problems with 
poverty; therefore, efforts to change consumption focused on the 
consequences to the poor.19  In contrast, for some elites and 
biologists, the reason for the need to change consumption 
patterns is to protect wildlife.20  This view has come under attack 
by commentators who argue that the focus on wildlife produces 
an imperialistic outcome on native poorer peoples.21  
Commentators criticize preservationists for seeking change in 
wildlife areas where the poor reside, rather than challenging 
unsustainable practices in wealthy parts of the world.22  The 
commentators focus on social equity and argue that the 
“wildlands” focus of environmentalism preserves the privilege of 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. (one good example is Gandhi’s endorsement of khadi as opposed to 
Indians purchasing Western manufactured clothing.  Gandhi viewed this choice 
as crucial to India’s economic and political independence from the British). 
 19. Gandhi stated: 
I venture to suggest that it is the fundamental law of Nature, 
without exception, that Nature produces enough for our wants from 
day to day, and if only everybody took enough for himself and 
nothing more, there would be no pauperism in this world, there 
would be no man dying of starvation in this world. 
John S. Moolakkattu, Gandhi as a Human Ecologist, 29 J. HUM. ECOLOGY 151, 
155 (2010). 
 20. Ramaehandra Guha, Radical American Environmentalism and 
Wilderness Preservation: A Third-World Critique, 11 ENVTL. ETHICS 71, 74-75 
(1989); see also Nehal Patel, Environmentalism, Consciousness & Schema-
Blending: Understanding Activists in the Environmental Movement (Am. 
Sociological Ass’n Annual Meeting, July 31, 2008), available at http://www.all 
academic.com/meta/p240729_index.html. 
 21. Guha, supra note 20, at 74-75. 
 22. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/5
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elite groups, since the poor are the easiest to displace to protect 
wildlands.23 
Despite these criticisms, a common argument in favor of 
pursuing wildlife preservation is that scientists are the experts 
who can determine which places are to be protected.24  However, 
the consequence of this view is that power shifts from those elites 
who control business to those who dictate science.25  The 
argument is cleverly political as much as it is a plea to save 
ecosystems, but in the process of shifting power from big business 
to scientists, the interests of the poor–who often are living in the 
“protected” area–are compromised or neglected.  In this debate 
between elites, the economic and political structures responsible 
for labeling the poor areas as “contested” are left entirely intact. 
Gandhi spared no effort in pointing out the interests of the 
invisible masses.26  His focus on the needs of the disempowered 
complicate the search for the environmental good; neither the 
argument for the “greater good” through economic growth nor the 
one through ecosystem preservation provide any direct resolution 
to the exploitative characteristics of the debate itself.  However, 
this has not stopped those involved in the “debate between elites” 
from co-opting Gandhi’s emphasis on people and therefore 
absorbing his social equity critique.27  For instance, the claim 
that deep ecology has eastern antecedents is reflected in Zen 
teacher Robert Aitken Roshi’s claim that Gandhi is not human-
centered, but rather eco-centered.28  This view has been criticized 
for reflecting an idea of the “East” as a collection of selected 
cultural images used by Western commentators to create their 
 
 23. See Syvlia Tesh & Eduardo Paes-Machado, Sewers, Garbage, and 
Environmentalism in Brazil, 13 J. ENV’T & DEV. 42 (2004); see also BARRY 
COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN & TECHNOLOGY (1972).  
 24. See SYLVIA TEST, UNCERTAIN HAZARDS: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISTS AND 
SCIENTIFIC PROOF (2000). 
 25. Daniel Janzen, The Future of Tropical Ecology, 17 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & 
SYSTEMATICS 305 (1986). 
 26. See GANDHI, supra note 6, at 464. 
 27. See MICHAEL COHEN, THE PATHLESS WAY: JOHN MUIR AND AMERICAN 
WILDERNESS 120 (1984) (an example of Orientalist conceptions of 
environmentalism); EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1980) (a critique of Orientalist 
framing in the West); Ronald Inden, Orientalist Constructions of India, 20 MOD. 
ASIAN STUD. 442 (1986); see also Guha, supra note 20, at 63-65. 
 28. See Guha, supra note 20. 
7
  
2013] MINDFUL ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE 1123 
 
own image of the human-nature relationship.29  Keeping in line 
with both the orientalist and romanticist views–both of which 
have an interest in keeping the East looking “mystical” and 
“exotic”–many contemporary environmentalists continue to view 
many “eastern” thinkers in a light favorable to, and compatible 
with, their own views.30 
Any analysis of nature preservation at the expense of social 
equity would be a problematic application of Gandhi’s life and 
teachings.  Therefore, when imagining how a mindful 
jurisprudence would apply to an environmental dispute, we must 
consider Gandhi’s central ideas about the complex relationships 
between the rich, the poor, and natural resources.  We provide 
speculations on how Gandhi’s thought can enrich environmental 
jurisprudence if we begin with his own views on core concepts in 
social theory31 as they apply to law. 
B.  Gandhi’s Influence on Law 
Ironically, the very profession Gandhi undertook as a young 
man–law–does not seem to have been influenced to the same 
degree as many other areas of thought.  Although his world-view 
influenced many elites and has had some impact on law in India 
in areas such as corporate social responsibility,32 Gandhi has not 
deeply impacted the method of jurisprudence in India or 
elsewhere.  Despite several calls in the contemporary critical 
legal scholarship for alternative views of law and legal systems,33 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Lester R. Kurtz, Gandhi and His Legacies, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
VIOLENCE, PEACE, AND CONFLICT 837 (2d ed. 2008). 
 32. Afra Afsharipour, Directors as Trustees of the Nation? India’s Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Reform Efforts, 34 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 995 (2011). 
 33. See Yxta Maya Murray, A Jurisprudence of Nonviolence, 9 CONN. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 65 (2009); see AJIT ATRI, GANDHI’S VIEW OF LEGAL JUSTICE (2007).  
Professor Jai Narain Sharma remarks in the forward: “[t]he legal profession has 
produced some of the finest and most independent characters whose names are 
imprinted on the scroll of history.  Mahatma Gandhi is one among them . . . 
[Atri] has raised several pertinent questions regarding legal justice in general 
and Gandhi’s view in particular.” Id. at xii-xiii; see also HEDGE, supra note 6; 
V.R. KRISHNA IYER, JURISPRUDENCE AND JURISCONSCIENCE A LA GANDHI (1976).  
For existing varieties of legal consciousness in environmental activism, see 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/5
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few scholars have made any serious attempt to speculate on how 
jurisprudence can be critiqued and reformed using Gandhi’s 
thought. 
Some commentators criticize legal thought as a system of 
ideas wrapped in its own tradition and unable to examine itself 
reflexively.34  Philosopher Wolcher believes “a philosophical work 
that limits itself to ‘law’ in the popular or academic sense has 
already sold its soul, as it were, to conventional ways of 
thinking.”35  Legal scholarship itself is susceptible to the strong 
pull of legal doctrines that stress the authority of precedent, and 
this tendency creates a problem when issues call for innovative or 
original insight.  Tradition can become an impediment to 
breaking through centuries-old assumptions that deeply shape 
legal thought, whether it be about the nature of reality, the 
composition of the self (and therefore the basis of rights), or the 
goals of social interactions. 
Gandhi’s thought provides law scholars with an opportunity 
to question many of the fundamental social assumptions 
embedded in traditional legal thought.  Given that Gandhi 
operated in both “Western” and “Eastern” paradigms 
simultaneously, he provides us with a basis for transcending the 
entrenched “East/West” divisions of our collective colonial past 
and the manner in which non-Western thought systems have 
been excluded from serious consideration in social theory. 
Gandhi’s writings strengthen alternative conceptions of 
environmental jurisprudence because many of his assumptions 
about the nature of reality and his conception of ethics do not 
entirely conform to the dominant philosophical frameworks of the 
West.  Using Gandhi as a building block in the conception of a 
new jurisprudence gives us freedom to question the basic 
organizing principles that are treated as conventional wisdom in 
Western thought.  Furthermore, our critique functions as a 
comprehensive alternative to dominant ways of thinking.  Our 
 
Nehal Patel, The Consciousness of Legal Mobilization (Am. Sociological Ass’n 
Annual Meeting, Aug. 14, 2010), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/ 
p410518_index.html. 
 34. See LOUIS E. WOLCHER, BEYOND TRANSCENDENCE IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 
(2005). 
 35. Id. at x. 
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view is more than a mere criticism because Gandhi’s thought 
contains a well-developed world-view from which we derive our 
own solutions and conclusions. 
To use Gandhi’s thought to reimagine jurisprudence, we 
must first identify themes that pervade his thought and apply 
them to legal arguments.  We will apply several themes in 
Gandhi’s life and writings to a recent case: MCWC.  There are 
two reasons for using this case.  First, the case has clear local 
ecological and legal importance to the state of Michigan and the 
surrounding area.  Second, the case embodies many of the 
fundamental struggles common in both Gandhi’s writings and in 
the environmental law between wealthy developers and local 
civilians. 
In Part II, we provide a brief summary of the facts and the 
key legal concepts used in the briefs submitted to the court by 
Nestlé, Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, and in amicus 
curiae briefs submitted by the Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality and the National Wildlife Federation.  We 
place special emphasis on the Public Trust Doctrine, Reasonable 
Use Doctrine, riparian rights, the “ecosystem nexus” theory, and 
determination of “significant public interest” as they relate to 
Gandhi’s thought. 
II.  KEY LEGAL CONCEPTS OF MCWC V. NESTLÉ 
In MCWC, Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation 
(Citizens) filed a civil action against Nestlé for the illegal use of a 
waterway in northern Michigan.36  The waterway consisted of a 
small river (the Dead Stream), a trio of bodies of water called the 
“Tri-Lakes,” and the Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetland.37  
Nestlé was granted groundwater rights from Donald Patrick and 
Nancy Gale Bollman, who were riparian owners living on the 
property along the Dead Steam.38  Nestlé obtained “all water 
rights in and under the [p]roperty” and “the right ‘to develop, use, 
extract, remove, pump and/or consume from any and all water 
sources thereon’” when Nestlé purchased the subsurface 
 
 36. See MCWC, 737 N.W.2d at 447. 
 37. Id. at 450. 
 38. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/5
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ground.39  The Bollmans also “leased to Nestlé the surface of the 
[p]roperty and granted Nestlé easements of ingress and egress to, 
from, and across the property.”40  Nestlé accessed groundwater 
under the Bollmans’ land via a pumping facility that Nestlé built 
along the Dead Stream.41 
A.  The Public Trust Doctrine 
The Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) provides that some 
resources can be held in trust for the public good.42  Over a 
century ago, the United States Supreme Court upheld the PTD by 
declaring that such lands cannot lawfully be conveyed for a 
private corporation’s profit-seeking use.43  Michigan courts use a 
test of “navigability” to determine whether or not a waterway can 
be protected from corporate use under the PTD.44  If a waterway 
is capable of sustaining commercial shipping, then the courts 
deem the stream navigable,45 and therefore, the waterway could 
be protected under the PTD.46  Michigan courts use a “log-
flotation test” to determine whether a stream is capable of 
sustaining commercial shipping and therefore subject to 
protection under the PTD.47  The log-flotation test states that a 
stream must have the capacity to float a number of large mill logs 
on the stream or body of water, thus making it navigable and 
capable of sustaining commercial shipping.48 
 
 39. Brief for Defendant-Appellee Opposition to Plaintiffs-Appellants' 
Application for Leave to Appeal at 5, Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation 
v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc. (Citizens), 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) 
(No. 130802) [hereinafter Defendant’s Opposition Brief]. 
 40. Id. 
 41. MCWC, 737 N.W.2d at 450. 
 42. PHILIP WEINBERG & KEVIN A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 51 (2d ed. 2008). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 218-20. 
 45. Id. at 218; see also Plaintiff-Appellant’s Application for Leave to Appeal 
at 34-36, Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (No. 256153) 
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Application]. 
 46. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 218-20. 
 47. Id. at 220. 
 48. Id. at 218.  The parties and the court use the term “mill logs” to describe 
large logs, but the court did not give a description of the weight or length of a 
mill log. 
11
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In the trial court, Citizens moved for summary judgment on 
the grounds that the “Dead Stream is subject to the public trust 
doctrine, and that diminishment of the flow of a public trust 
stream for diversion and sale by a private person for a private 
profit is unlawful.”49  The trial court rejected Citizens’ motion for 
summary judgment.50  On appeal, Citizens cited Bott v. Natural 
Resources Commission,51 arguing that the Dead Stream is 
capable of floating a commercially viable log because the stream 
is capable of floating a “shingle bolt,” which is defined as a 
sixteen to eighteen inch chunk of wood.52  In contrast, Nestlé 
argued that the Dead Stream did not need protection under the 
PTD because only the stream’s “public access” points require 
protection to preserve the public’s interest in the waterway.53  
Nestlé reasoned that a body of water near the Dead Stream called 
“the Tri-Lakes” provides the Dead Stream with “public access” 
points which need protection, and therefore, the stream itself 
does not require protection under the PTD.54  Furthermore,  
Nestlé argued that the Dead Stream is not subject to the PTD 
since they are not withdrawing water directly from the stream.55  
Instead, Nestlé claims it was pumping water from an aquifer that 
is the source of springs that feed the Dead Stream.56 
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Citizens’ protection 
of the Dead Stream under the PTD.57  However, the court of 
appeals also rejected Nestlé’s public trust reasoning that the area 
is protected by protection of the “access points” only, as opposed 
to providing protection to the entire stream.58  The court cited 
Moore v. Sanborne, in which an entire waterway is navigable, and 
therefore subject to the PTD, if it will sustain commercial 
 
 49. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 6. 
 50. Id. at 22. 
 51. Bott v. Comm’n of Natural Res. of State of Mich. Dept. of Natural Res., 
327 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. 1982). 
 52. See Plaintiff’s Application, supra note 45, at 34-36 (discussing Bott). 
 53. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 34-35. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 36-39. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 58. Id.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Nestlé’s 
claim. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/5
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shipping or if its natural state has the capacity to float mill logs.59  
The court of appeals reasoned that Moore and Bott both require 
the floating of large mill logs to demonstrate navigability.60  
Under this reasoning, the court concluded that the Dead Stream 
failed the log-flotation test.61  Therefore, both the trial court and 
court of appeals determined that the Dead Stream was not 
navigable and unable to sustain commercial shipping.  
Consequently, the stream is not protected under the PTD.62 
B.  The Reasonable Use Doctrine 
The reasonable use doctrine is used frequently, and Michigan 
uses a “reasonable-use balancing test.”63  The balancing test for 
the reasonable use doctrine in Michigan is the same “log-flotation 
test” applied to the PTD.  The “log-flotation test” states that a 
stream must hold the capacity to float a number of large mill logs 
to be considered navigable.  If the Dead Stream is not considered 
navigable, then the stream could not sustain commercial 
shipping.64  Therefore, since the court of appeals concluded that 
the Dead Stream was not navigable, the use of the Dead Stream 
by Nestlé for commercial purposes did not qualify as reasonable 
use.65 
The reasonable use doctrine also includes a “fair 
participation” component which balances the utility of competing 
parties’ claims to reasonable use.66  Michigan courts use a fair 
participation test that takes into account whether the water 
being withdrawn is used “on-tract” or “off-tract.”67  In MCWC, the 
dispute over reasonable use compares the plaintiff’s riparian 
right to the reasonable use of the Dead Stream versus Nestlé’s 
 
 59. Id. (citing Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519 (1853)). 
 60. Id. at 218-19. 
 61. Id. at 219. 
 62. See id. at 222. 
 63. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 19; see also Citizens, 709 
N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 64. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 19. 
 65. Id. at 20-21. 
 66. Id. at 10 (“Michigan courts have sought to ensure ‘the greatest possible 
access to water for all users while protecting certain traditional water uses.’”). 
 67. Id.; see also Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 199. 
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right to the reasonable use of groundwater from the land it owns 
in fee simple.68  Nestlé purchased the subsurface ground from 
Donald Patrick and Nancy Gale Bollman, who were riparian 
owners living on the property.69  When they purchased the land, 
Nestlé claimed to obtain “all water rights in and under the 
[p]roperty” and “the right to develop, use, extract, remove, pump, 
and/or consume from any and all water sources thereon.”70  In 
addition, the Bollmans leased to Nestlé “the surface of the 
[p]roperty and granted Nestlé easements of ingress and egress to, 
from, and across the [p]roperty.”71 
The trial court originally ruled that an off-tract, out-of-
watershed use of groundwater cannot measurably diminish the 
flow of surface water to another riparian.72  In other words, the 
trial court states that off-tract use is defined as use out of the 
relevant watershed, or out if its source watershed or groundwater 
aquifer,73 and off-tract use cannot reduce the natural flow to the 
riparian body.74  The trial court’s emphasis on limiting off-tract 
use suggests that uses of water off-tract should be treated 
differently than uses of water on-tract in the relevant watershed 
or aquifer.75  Under this reasoning, Nestlé argued that its actions 
constituted a “reasonable use.”76  Furthermore, Nestlé employed 
utilitarian reasoning, arguing that “Michigan courts have sought 
to ensure ‘the greatest possible access to water for all users while 
protecting certain traditional water uses.’”77  Nestlé relied heavily 
on the interpretation of “fair participation” as “the use of water by 
 
 68. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 205. 
 69. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 4.  However, the court 
repeatedly stated that Nestlé was not a riparian owner regardless of Nestlé’s 
claim to possessing all water rights. 
 70. Id. at 5. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 8; see also Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé 
Waters N. Am., Inc., 2003 WL 25659349, at *48 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2003). 
 73. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 2003 WL 25659349, at *48. 
 74. Id.; see also Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 10 (stating, 
“Michigan courts have sought to ensure 'the greatest possible access to water for 
all users while protecting certain traditional water uses.’”). 
 75. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 23-43. 
 76. Id. at 24. 
 77. Id. at 10. 
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the greatest number of users.”78  It claimed that since there are 
many non-riparian users who can benefit from Nestlé’s access to 
the water resource, the riparian owners’ rights should not impede 
what is in the interest of the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people.79 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s statement of 
the law and adopted a different version of the reasonable-use 
balancing test.80  Using its own utilitarian reasoning, the court 
sought to ensure the greatest possible access to water resources 
for all users while protecting certain traditional water users.81  
Consequently, the court’s reasonable-use test requires a 
determination of what is considered a “traditional water use.”82  
In making this determination, the court of appeals listed a 
number of balancing test factors that are to be considered.83  The 
factors are not listed in any hierarchy of importance, and the 
court’s reasoning provides no clear guidance regarding how the 
several factors are to be weighed should they fail to point to a 
specific outcome.84  Presumably, the court’s guidance is vague 
because of the need to apply the test on a case-by-case basis.85  In 
the past, Michigan courts have avoided strict reasonable use 
interpretations for this reason.86 
 
 78. Id. at 23. 
 79. Id. at 10-11. 
 80. See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 201 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 202-03. 
 83. Id. at 202-05. 
 84. See id. 
 85. However, the court did give preference to riparian uses: 
Further, in order to ensure that the needs of local water users are 
met first, water uses that benefit the riparian land or the land from 
which the groundwater was removed are given preference over water 
uses that ship the water away or otherwise benefit land unconnected 
with the location from which the water was extracted. 
Id. at 204. 
 86. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 29 (“Michigan has long 
eschewed such rigid formulations, instead adopting a reasonable-use test 
allowing courts to ‘consider all the circumstances that are relevant in a given 
case,’ in order to protect the environment, while at the same time promoting 
socially and economically beneficial water uses.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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Although the court of appeals did not provide much guidance 
for future cases, it entered a final order on February 14, 2006 
stating that Nestlé’s water removal was unreasonable.87  The 
court of appeals cited Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor88 in which 
there was a dispute between an on-tract user of groundwater and 
a city that planned to pump groundwater off-tract to meet 
municipal needs.89  Schenk raised the idea of “material 
diminishment” in reasonable use, which means an off-tract user 
cannot cause an interference with an on-tract use.90  Schenk drew 
a distinction between on-tract and off-tract users, which created 
different standards of reasonable use for on-tract and off-tract 
users.91  Although the court of appeals used reasoning from 
Schenk to limit Nestlé’s conduct, it also cited limitations for on-
tract users in dicta.92  The court of appeals cited Maerz v. U.S. 
Steel93 in support of the proposition that an on-tract user of 
groundwater cannot unreasonably interfere with a neighbor’s on-
tract use.94 
C.  Riparian Rights 
The common law of riparian rights recognizes that an owner 
of streamside, or riparian, property has a right to the absolute, 
unimpeded flow of water, and the owner can obtain damages or 
an injunction against an upstream owner for interference with 
that right.95  The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff’s 
riparian rights outweigh Nestlé’s contractual right to the 
reasonable use of groundwater from the Bollmans’ land.96  Nestlé 
purchased from the Bollmans the subsurface ground beneath 139 
acres of the Sanctuary.97  “Nestlé also obtained ‘all water rights 
 
 87. Id. at 1. 
 88. Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109 (Mich. 1917). 
 89. See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 197-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 90. Schenk, 163 N.W. at 112. 
 91. Id. at 112-15. 
 92. See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 200. 
 93. Maerz v. U.S. Steel Corp., 323 N.W.2d 524, 529-30 (1982). 
 94. See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 200. 
 95. See WEINBERG & REILLY, supra note 42, at 50. 
 96. See generally Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174. 
 97. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 4. 
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in and under the Property,’ and the right ‘to develop, use, extract, 
remove, pump and/or consume water from any and all water 
sources thereon.’”98  Additionally, “the Bollmans leased to Nestlé 
the surface of the Property and granted Nestlé easements of 
ingress and egress to, from, and across the Property.”99  Nestlé 
argued that this fee gave Nestlé property rights to use the 
groundwater, a right just as valid and enforceable as the 
Plaintiff’s riparian rights to use the Dead Stream.100 
Citizens argued that Nestlé’s purchase of the land did not 
allow them to obtain riparian rights to the Dead Stream.101  In 
addition, Citizens argued that they were successful in meeting 
their burden of proof regarding harm to their riparian 
interests.102  Citizens also argued that an “off-tract user could not 
cause any interference with a use on-tract.”103  To support their 
claim, Citizens cited Hart v. D’Agostini,104 which said the 
removal, transporting, and consumption of water elsewhere (i.e., 
to a location other than the original source) is an unreasonable 
use of the specific land.105  Moreover, the National Wildlife 
Federation (NWF) filed an Amicus Curiae Brief and stated that 
the Michigan Conservations Club, Tip of the Miff Watershed 
Council, Pickerel-Crooked Lakes Association, and many other 
organizations have an interest in the Osprey Lake Impoundment 
and Wetland.106  The Amici argued that many organization 
 
 98. Id. at 5. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 2. 
 101. Id.  Citizens also assert that their use of the stream is a reasonable use 
worthy of protection. 
 102. See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Plaintiff’s 
Application, supra note 45, at 2. 
 103. Plaintiff’s Application, supra note 45, at 22.  Citizens also cited Schenk v. 
City of Ann Arbor, which involved a public water company intentionally 
removing water from the original source and transporting it elsewhere for 
consumption. Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109, 110 (Mich. 1917). 
 104. 151 N.W.2d 826, 828 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967). 
 105. See Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., 
Inc., 2003 WL 25659349, at *48 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2003). 
 106. See Brief for the National Wildlife Federation et al. as Amici Curiae at 1, 
Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (No. 130802) [hereinafter NWF’s 
Brief]. 
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members had vested riparian property interests that could be 
affected by the outcome of the case.107 
The trial court held in favor of Citizens’ claim that riparian 
uses were superior to groundwater uses.108  However, in this 
situation, the trial court rejected the correlative rights rule, 
stating that the rule applies to competing groundwater users, 
rather than applying to competing uses between an off-tract and 
on-tract user.109  Therefore, although the court rejected the 
correlative rights rule, the court made a clear connection between 
riparian users, on-tract versus off-tract use, and reasonable use. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial court holding 
that riparian uses were superior to groundwater uses and added 
that “[t]he loss of recreational use and the physical alteration of 
the Dead Stream will directly and substantially harm the 
riparian value of the Dead Stream.”110  The court of appeals also 
held that the plaintiffs (Citizens) have standing because of their 
status as riparian owners.111  As NWF stated in their brief, 
“[Citizens] are riparian owners who live and recreate in the area 
negatively affected by Nestlé’s pumping.”112  Furthermore, 
“harms to the Osprey Lake Impoundment and the Enumerated 
Wetlands negatively affect Plaintiffs’ riparian properties, as well 
as Plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their riparian rights, which 
include recreational and aesthetic interests in maintaining the 
ecological integrity of the area.”113 
 
 107. Id. at 1. 
 108. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 2003 WL 25659349, at *47. 
 109. Id. (“The court there uses what it called the “correlative rights” rule, 
relying on the Restatement of torts, 2nd sec. 858. That tort concept applies to 
competing users of groundwater, a situation not relevant here.”). 
 110. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 206 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 111. Id. at 208. 
 112. NWF’s Brief, supra note 106, at 14. 
 113. Id. 
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D.  Ecosystem Nexus Theory 
The basis of standing referred to as “ecosystem nexus theory” 
was discussed in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.114  Ecosystem 
nexus theorizes that by “recognizing the complex, reciprocal 
nature of the ecosystem as well as the hydrologic interaction, 
connection, or interrelationship between these natural resources . 
. . [the] negative effects on one part [of an aquifer system is] likely 
to impact another in such a shallow aquifer system.”115  In other 
words, portions of the ecosystem are not to be individually 
considered when damage has occurred.  Rather, when examining 
injury, the entire ecosystem should be taken as a whole.116 
Ecosystem nexus theory directly relates to MCWC because 
the theory challenges Nestlé’s implicit contention that each 
affected body of water should be treated as if it existed in a 
bubble.117  Nestlé argued that their pumping along one stream 
was not reason enough for Plaintiffs to bring suit regarding the 
Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetlands.118  However, in 
contrast to the basis of Nestlé’s argument, ecosystem nexus 
theory states that all bodies of water in a contiguous ecosystem 
are interconnected, and the negative effects of one lake 
impoundment will inevitably affect the biological character of 
another interconnected lake impoundment, and so on.119 
 
 114. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 (1992); see also Brief for 
Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality as Amici Curiae at 23-24, Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005) [hereinafter DEQ’s Brief]. 
 115. DEQ’s Brief, supra note 114, at 24. 
 116. Id. 
 117. MCWC, 737 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Mich. 2007).  Court of Appeals Judges 
White and Murphy, forming the majority on the standing question, disagreed 
with Nestlé.  Concurring that plaintiffs had standing “with respect to all the 
natural resources at issue,” Judge Murphy wrote that “plaintiffs have standing 
because of the complex, reciprocal nature of the ecosystem that encompasses the 
pertinent natural resources noted above and because of the hydrologic 
interaction, connection, or interrelationship between these natural resources, 
the springs, the aquifer, and defendant Nestle’s pumping activities, whereby 
impact on one particular resource caused by Nestle’s pumping necessarily 
affects other resources in the surrounding area.” Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 225 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 118. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174. 
 119. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1992). 
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The trial court and court of appeals in MCWC acknowledged 
the definition of ecosystem nexus in Lujan120 and found that the 
Dead Stream and the Osprey Lake Impoundment are both a part 
of the Tri-Lakes ecosystem, therefore making them subject to the 
ecosystem nexus theory.121  In other words, the court ruled that 
these bodies of water are part of an aquatic watershed and 
therefore constitute a contiguous ecosystem.122  Additionally, the 
trial court stated that all interconnected bodies of water, 
including the Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetlands, are 
negatively affected by Nestlé’s use, and the ecosystem as a whole 
suffers as a result of Nestlé’s pumping.123  The court further 
noted that Nestlé’s pumping had a negative effect on the level, 
temperature, and quality of water in the Dead Stream, including 
adjacent wetlands.124  The court also noted that eventually, the 
entire ecosystem’s natural and biological character is weakened 
because it becomes more susceptible to invasive species and 
changes to the fundamental characteristics of the entire 
ecosystem.125  The court noted that Nestlé’s pumping has such a 
negative effect on the Osprey Lake Impoundment and adjacent 
wetlands that it destabilizes the ecological integrity of the entire 
ecosystem.126  Therefore, the court concluded that the effects of 
Nestlé’s pumping were reason enough for the Plaintiffs to bring 
suit.127 
 
 120. MCWC, 737 N.W.2d at 457. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc., 
2003 WL 25659349, at *13 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2003).  In addition, the court not only 
stressed that the negative effects on one part likely impacts another, but the 
damage is worse for such a shallow aquifer system such as the Osprey Lake 
Impoundment Watershed. Id. 
 124. Id. at *31. 
 125. Id. at *36. 
 126. Id. at *41. 
 127. See generally id.  For the full reasoning of the trial court as explained by 
the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, see DEQ’s Brief, supra 
note 114, at 24-26. 
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E.  Significant Public Interest 
The concept of “significant public interest” plays a crucial 
role throughout the MCWC.  The trial court and court of appeals 
both agreed that the Legislature has the authority to provide a 
means for any citizen to protect their interest in the preservation 
of the state’s natural resources due to significant public 
interest.128  The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
(MDEQ) submitted an amicus curiae brief that suggested specific 
causes of action for those affected by pollution, impairment, or 
destruction of natural resources against specific persons who 
cause such pollution, impairment, or destruction.129  Moreover, 
MDEQ’s brief explained the grounds for claims that address 
significant public interest in matters such as the case against 
Nestlé.130  While the Michigan Environmental Protection Act was 
being enacted, MDEQ wanted to provide for the protection of 
natural resources by creating a cause of action for an interest 
reserved by the people.  MDEQ argued that the people of 
Michigan declared in the state’s Constitution that the manner in 
which natural resources of the state are conserved and developed 
is of “paramount public concern.”131  Furthermore, “[t]he 
conservation and development of the natural resources of the 
state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in 
the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the 
people.”132 
The court referenced the Michigan Constitution, which 
indicates that proper conservation and development of natural 
resources impacts the health, safety, and general welfare of the 
citizens of Michigan.133  The court concluded that the matters 
raised in MCWC are matters of significant public interest.134 
 
 128. DEQ’s Brief, supra note 114, at 21. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 10-11. 
 131. Id. at 11. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc., 
2003 WL 25659349, at *52 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2003). 
 134. See generally id. 
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III.   SPECULATIONS ON A MINDFUL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
In Part III, we analyze the legal briefs and court opinion in 
MCWC by applying Gandhi’s thought to the concepts central to 
the case.  We highlight Gandhi’s view of environmental 
trusteeship, utility, rights, and industrialization.  Through this 
concrete application of Gandhi’s thought, we seek to develop a 
jurisprudence that is more mindful of its broader implications to 
the environment and society. 
A.   Connecting the Public Trust Doctrine to Gandhi’s 
 Theory of Trusteeship 
Gandhi’s theory of trusteeship influences certain areas of law 
and society in India, such as the corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) discourse.135  Gandhi’s theory of trusteeship when applied 
to CSR has been called “revolutionary”136 and had as its 
foundation a world-view that eschewed the modern acceptance of 
profit purely for the sake of private owners.  He viewed the 
 
 135. Afsharipour, supra note 32, at 1012-13; see also Timothy L. Fort & Cindy 
A. Schipani, The Role of the Corporation in Fostering Sustainable Peace, 35 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 426 (2002) (“There is a belief underlying 
contemporary business strategy that as long as one operates within the bounds 
of the law, one is free to engage in any business practice that does not harm the 
self-interest of the company. Implicit in this understanding is the notion that 
other societal institutions are in place to protect interests that require 
protecting, so that it is not the responsibility of a corporation to be concerned 
with these issues.”).  Gandhi says 90% of people need no governance, only the 
top 5% constituted by greedy white collar or black market criminals and the 
bottom 5% comprised of common criminals. VED MEHTA, MAHATMA GANDHI AND 
HIS APOSTLES 214 (1977). 
 136. See Afsharipour, supra note 32, at 1013 (“Gandhi's view of the ownership 
of capital was one of trusteeship motivated by the belief that essentially society 
was providing capitalists with an opportunity to manage resources which need 
to be managed on behalf of society in general.”) (citation omitted); see also 
MEERA MITRA, IT'S ONLY BUSINESS! INDIA'S CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIVENESS IN 
A GLOBALIZED WORLD 20-25 (2007); Interview by Jitendra Singh with R. 
Bandyophadyay, Chairman, Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Wharton 
School (June 17, 2010), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/ 
article.cfm?articleid=4488 (the Chairman stated that directors and senior 
management are “custodians of public money, they are the trustees—if we go to 
the Mahatma Gandhi concept of trusteeship . . . . They are actually the trustees 
of the nation.”). 
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wealth of the richest individuals and organizations as being part 
of the nation’s wealth, and he viewed the control of that wealth as 
carrying with it the responsibility to use it for the social good.137 
Many view Gandhi’s view of trusteeship to imply income 
equality, and Gandhi certainly expressed concern about the wide 
gaps between the rich and poor.138  However, it was the use of 
wealth for meaningful social goals that concerned Gandhi, and 
this concern did not necessarily imply income equality as an end 
for its own sake.139  Gandhi tolerated some amount of inequality 
provided that the wealthy used their resources for the benefit of 
society.140  Equality by itself did not necessarily focus on his 
ultimate goal: to use wealth for the “social good.”141 
 
 137. GANDHI, September 10, 1928 – January 14, 1929, in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 413 (“Unless the capitalists of India 
help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and 
by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the 
service of the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying 
the masses or being destroyed by them.”). 
 138. GANDHI, July 16, 1940 – December 27, 1940, in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 114 (India’s economy will “be a 
structure on sand if it is not built on the solid foundation of economic equality…  
everyone will have a proper house to live in, sufficient and balanced food to eat, 
and sufficient khadi with which to cover himself.  It also means that the cruel 
inequality that obtains today will be removed by purely non-violent means.”). 
 139. GANDHI, September 16, 1934 – December 15, 1934, in COLLECTED WORKS 
OF MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 318 (however, Gandhi did believe 
that his principle of trusteeship would produce more equality than the status 
quo.  He said, “[a]bsolute trusteeship is an abstraction like Euclid’s definition of 
a point, and is equally unattainable. But if we strive for it, we shall be able to go 
further in realizing a state of equality on earth than by any other method.”). 
 140. GANDHI, July 16, 1940 – Dec. 27, 1940, in COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA 
GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 114 (“Economic equality must never be 
supposed to mean possession of an equal amount of worldly goods by 
everyone.”); see also DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 91. 
 141. GANDHI, July 16, 1940 – Dec. 27, 1940, in COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA 
GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 133-34 (“[A]t the root of this doctrine of equal 
distribution must lie that of the trusteeship of the wealthy for the superfluous 
wealth possessed by them. . . . The rich man will be left in possession of his 
wealth, of which he will use what he reasonably requires for his personal needs 
and will act as a trustee for the remainder to be used for the society. . . . As soon 
as man looks upon himself as a servant of society, earns for its sake, spends for 
its benefit, then purity enters into his earnings and there is ahimsa in his 
venture. Moreover, if men’s minds turn towards this way of life, there will come 
about a peaceful revolution in society, and that without any bitterness.”). 
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Gandhi’s conception of social good included the proper long-
term management of natural resources.142  His concern that 
India’s adoption of Western economy would “strip the earth bare” 
shows a strong concern for stewardship.143  Similarly, in 
contemporary jurisprudence, the idea of resource management 
relies on a view of people as “stewards” of the environment.  
However, American jurisprudence implicitly accepts the Western 
human-environment dialectic as a foundation of thought.  This 
particular dialectic imagines the world as a place containing 
resources for people to use; as a result, the notion of humans 
having dominion over the earth and the right to acquire property 
for private use has a long history of influence in American 
jurisprudence. 
In contrast, Gandhi’s world-view does not accept this human-
environment dialectic.  Gandhi referred to his life’s goal as being 
“to make myself zero,”144 and pursuing this goal was his effort to 
preserve the dignity of the individual and the world.  His 
conception of himself perhaps is best expressed in the Sanskrit 
maxim “tat tvam asi” (meaning “you are that” or “you are the 
other”), the full realization of which is life’s highest goal.  As a 
result, for Gandhi, the goal of life was to “reduce to zero” the 
perceived distance between the self and other.  This view of the 
world makes the treatment of the “other”–whether that other is 
“human,” “sentient,” or “inanimate” in the Western conception–as 
important as treatment of oneself.  In his conception of the world, 
violence to one’s surroundings was as destructive as violence done 
 
 142. GANDHI, September 10, 1928 – January 14, 1929, in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 412-13 (“If an entire nation of 300 
millions [sic] took to similar economic exploitation [by the West], it would strip 
the world bare like locusts.”). 
 143. Even the question of whether “natural” objects can be represented in 
court has been a point of resource management debate in both India and the 
United States. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?: LAW, 
MORALITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, n.1 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2010) 
(discussing the idol case in India and criticisms waged in U.S. jurisprudence at 
the question of whether trees should have standing). 
 144. GANDHI, supra note 6, at 464 (“I must reduce myself to zero. So long as 
man does not of his own free will put himself last among his fellow-creatures, 
there is no salvation for him. Ahimsa is the farthest limit of humility.”); see 
DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 122 (discussing possible theological influences on 
Gandhi’s theory of trusteeship). 
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unto oneself, and therefore, the world was conceived of as a 
family.145 
Gandhi constantly tried to expand the notion of family to 
include the world and not merely one’s immediate kin.  He often 
referred to his life as a series of “experiments with Truth,” and 
the vehicle of Truth was ahimsa, or “non-violence.”  Through 
exploring ahimsa, Gandhi concluded that “for a non-violent 
person, the whole world is one family.  He will not fear others nor 
will others fear him.”146  To Gandhi, it seems that to engulf the 
entire world in the notion of family was the logical conclusion of 
ahimsa and the social manifestation of “tat tvam asi.”  Naturally, 
then, a life lived through ahimsa led to the view that the wealthy 
held their wealth in trust for the benefit of their entire family. 
Gandhi’s expanded conception of the family, therefore, 
implicitly informs his theory of trusteeship.  The theory is 
grounded in a world-view that recognizes the universe as a single 
entity, one that is comprised of parts that seem different at first 
appearance but fundamentally are the same.  As a result, all 
people had a duty to care for the world as one family, with the 
wealthy playing a significant role due to their unique social 
position.147 
Therefore, one way to view the PTD using Gandhi’s thought 
is to view it as incumbent upon wealthy entities to use their 
 
 145. See DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 121-22 (Non-violence not only mattered 
in terms of the ends of human conduct, but also was significant to the means of 
human conduct for Gandhi.  Therefore, non-violent treatment of others was 
important not only for the well-being of the other, but also as a practice that 
both reflected and cultivated a non-violent mind for the practitioner.  For a 
discussion of non-violence applied to trusteeship). 
 146. MADHU MASKAN, THE QUINTESSENCE OF GANDHI: IN HIS OWN WORDS 
(1984). 
 147. DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 118-29.  This world-view has its roots in a 
special form of “experimentation” that involves an exploration of the human 
mind.  For an expanded discussion of world-view, see EKNATH EASWARAN, THE 
UPANISHADS 7-30 (1987); EKNATH EASWARAN, THE DHAMMAPADA 7-77 (1985).  For 
a cognitive social science discussion of world-view, mind, and environmentalism, 
see Nehal Ambalal Patel, Consciousness in the Environmental Movement (2009) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with 
Northwestern University Library); see also Nehal Patel, Schemas, Cognitive 
Social Science, and Blending in Social Movements: The Case of Environmental 
Activists (Am. Sociological Ass’n Annual Meeting, Aug. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p504537_index.html. 
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wealth in the interests of the public good.  In contemporary 
American jurisprudence and its Roman origins, the PTD views 
the state as trustee of the land, and therefore, responsibility for 
the lands falls on the government.148  It is well established in 
American jurisprudence that lands held in Public Trust cannot be 
“conveyed for a private corporation’s profit-seeking use.”149  
Therefore, the common law of the PTD already restrains the 
profit-seeking of corporations, but American common law does not 
speak to any role of trusteeship upon the wealthy. 
In contrast, Gandhi’s emphasis on the wealth of the rich 
being held in trust raises the question of how and why our 
jurisprudence does not raise this sense of responsibility directly 
onto wealthy organizations.  Under Gandhi’s theory of 
trusteeship, in MCWC, a multi-billion dollar corporation such as 
Nestlé would have to address its responsibility as trustee of the 
nation’s wealth (in this case, the nation’s wealth is its natural 
resources such as the Dead Stream ecosystem).  Rather than 
viewing the corporation in the negative–as an entity to restrain–
Gandhi’s theory of trusteeship views the corporation in the 
positive–as an entity whose responsibilities are to be realized and 
demanded.  Therefore, an application of Gandhi’s theory of 
trusteeship to the law shifts the focus from how to prevent 
negative corporate behavior to how to unleash positive corporate 
social responsibility. 
B.   Connecting the Reasonable Use Doctrine & 
 “Significant Public Interest” to Sarvodaya 
a.  The Reasonable Use Doctrine 
Gandhi’s thought contains guidelines for reasonable use of 
goods and resources that are different from most Western views.  
In classical utilitarianism, for instance, the maxim “the greatest 
good for the greatest number of people” is used to validate the use 
of a good or resource.  Nestlé used such reasoning when it argued 
 
 148. WEINBERG & REILLY, supra note 42, at 51 (Originally from Roman and 
English Common law, in which the Crown was responsible for the lands as 
trustee). 
 149. Id. at 51; Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
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that its use of the Dead Stream would result in thousands of 
gallons of bottled water that a large number of people will 
drink.150  In other words, Nestlé’s use of the stream arguably 
leads to the greatest good for the greatest number of people. 
In contrast to a classical utilitarian view, Gandhi used a view 
based on “the welfare of all” which he termed sarvodaya.151  Both 
sarvodaya and utilitarianism relate to the reasonable use 
doctrine because they both contain guiding principles to 
determine reasonable use.  In a standard utilitarian analysis, the 
question is examined by asking what provides the greatest good 
to the greatest number; in sarvodaya, the question is examined 
by asking what is in the welfare of all. 
Because “use” is the central concept in the Reasonable Use 
Doctrine, we must engage Gandhi’s thought by beginning with 
guidance he provides on what constitutes proper “use.”  To 
determine proper use in Gandhi’s thought, we can begin by 
considering the difference between “want-regarding” and “ideal-
regarding” economic behavior.  Barry distinguishes between 
“want-regarding” and “ideal-regarding” principles of economics.152  
In the “want-regarding” principle, people’s preferences for certain 
goods or services are treated as an implicit starting point for 
economic analysis, in which people’s wants are accepted as they 
are, and markets emerge to provide opportunities to satisfy those 
wants.  In “want-regarding” reasoning, policy is shaped by the 
question of how people’s wants can be attained.  This is the 
dominant perspective in contemporary economic thought.  In 
contrast, the “ideal-regarding” principle considers that some 
wants are not worth satisfying, and therefore, economic 
behavior–including what people want–is mediated by human 
values.  In other words, “ideal-regarding” behavior would not 
place priority solely on what people want; rather, other 
considerations, such as a person’s ethical preferences, are of value 
in deciding on a proper course of economic action.153 
 
 150. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 10. 
 151. DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 168; see also Nirmal Kumar Bose, The 
Theory and Practice of Sarvodaya, in THE MEANINGS OF GANDHI 79 (Paul F. 
Power ed., 1971). 
 152. BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 38 (1965). 
 153. Id. 
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In MCWC, Michigan’s reasonable-use balancing test154 
determines what constitutes “reasonable use” for an industry or 
corporation when its imperatives are weighed against the needs 
of local users and the ecosystem.  Nestlé argued that its selling of 
bottled water for profit-seeking use would result in the greatest 
good for the greatest number.  It is clear that Nestlé used an 
explicit utilitarian calculus and even satisfied the expectation of 
some utilitarian thinkers to quantify the greatest good, since one 
could conceivably calculate the number of people receiving water 
and compare it to the number that would not have received it.  
Within utilitarian thinking, therefore, Nestlé can make such an 
argument. 
However, Nestlé can only make this argument because this 
overtly utilitarian reasoning does not tackle the question of 
whether want-regarding reasoning is justifiable in this instance.  
If Nestlé can simply incorporate self-regarding behavior (profit-
seeking) into convenient want-regarding utilitarian reasoning, 
then the corporation need not do anything except think about 
what it wants.  In sarvodaya, however, a party must consider the 
welfare of all.  As a result, Nestlé must consider the harm to the 
riparian owners and include their loss into the calculus of the 
greatest good.  Furthermore, if we use sarvodaya as a starting 
point, it is not sufficient for Nestlé to argue that people want the 
bottled water because the ultimate question is what is in the 
welfare of all, not whose view satisfies a greater good.155 
Nestlé could argue that the welfare of all means the 
willingness of the riparian owners to set aside their rights to 
benefit all of Nestlé’s bottled water customers.  However, Gandhi 
saw the proper course of action in terms that lifted the dignity of 
all parties involved, and he did not view rights in a purely 
“either/or” confrontational fashion.  As was true in his dealings 
with the British Empire, it may have been tempting to view 
Indian and British rights as absolutely in contrast; however, to 
Gandhi, it was possible to achieve freedom for Indians and 
simultaneously benefit the oppressor.  In a similar spirit, the 
question of Nestlé’s use of the waterway must include a calculus 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. See DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 168; Bose, supra note 151, at 80. 
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of how the riparian owners would be benefitted, thus raising the 
requirement of satisfying the “welfare of all” instead of assuming 
that riparian rights must be sacrificed for a “greater good,” which 
only one group allegedly possesses the power to exercise. 
With their argument, Nestlé hides its self-interest in a 
utilitarian garb.  Nestlé argues for control over a large portion of 
the water by including the use of its customers as a part of its 
“corporate use.”  The inclusion of customers can help Nestlé 
achieve the “greatest number of people” qualification of 
utilitarianism and can lead to a conclusion where the course of 
action that benefits the most drinkers is the desirable conclusion.  
However, this reasoning requires Nestlé’s control to extract, 
bottle, and sell the water to the drinkers.  Therefore, this 
“greatest number of users” argument is a construction of the 
social world that merely developed to satisfy Nestlé’s profit-
seeking motive. 
The court repeatedly stated that Michigan courts have 
purposefully avoided strict guidelines on this topic.156  Because 
the court in MCWC did not list the factors in the reasonable-use 
balancing test in any hierarchy of importance, its opinion 
provides no clear guidance regarding how the several factors are 
to be weighed.  This lack of guidance allowed Nestlé to frame its 
conduct as utilitarian and assume that solutions must be 
competitive and interests must be contrasted to determine 
reasonable use. 
In contrast, if sarvodaya replaced utilitarian thinking, then a 
hierarchy of importance could be based on a single “ideal-
regarding” principle: parties are expected to develop a method of 
action which will raise the welfare of all, not satisfy its own want.  
This expectation forces parties to include an “other-regarding” 
view of conflict in which persuasive arguments must be implicitly 
and subtly collaborative.  In other words, parties to a case 
automatically become intellectual agents of non-harm, rather 
 
 156. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 29 (“Michigan has long 
eschewed such rigid formulations, instead, adopting a reasonable use test, 
allowing courts to ‘consider all the circumstances that are relevant in a given 
case,’ 269 Mich. App at 55, in order to protect the environment, while at the 
same time promoting socially and economically beneficial water uses.”); see also 
Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
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than actors approaching a case in a pure “want-regarding” 
fashion.  Consequently, the reasonable-use balancing test differs 
when “ideal-regarding” sarvodaya is used as a guiding principle 
rather than “want-regarding” utilitarianism, and the Reasonable 
Use Doctrine is fundamentally altered under a sarvodaya 
standard. 
b. “Significant Public Interest” 
The court already seems to use reasoning similar to Gandhi’s 
thought when it determined “significant public interest.”  Both 
the trial court and court of appeals reasoned that Nestlé’s 
pumping created significant harm during the extraction 
process.157  The court implicitly seems to consider ahimsa (non-
harm) when evaluating the extraction process.  Sarvodaya, like 
other aspects of Gandhi’s thought, implicitly accepts ahimsa as a 
guiding principle in determining the “welfare of all.”  Therefore, 
the court’s analysis of “significant public interest” already 
contains within it a consideration of both ahimsa and sarvodaya. 
C.   Connecting Riparian Rights to Gandhi’s Theory of 
 Rights 
There is no shortage of rights discourse in contemporary 
legal and political theory, and Gandhi certainly participated in 
discussions of rights.  In his thought, rights are of paramount 
importance, and the dignity of individuals and of oppressed 
groups depends on the protection of such rights.  However, 
Gandhi seemed averse to the discussion of rights when the 
discussion did not include an even greater emphasis on duty.  
Gandhi’s theory of rights asserts that every right has a 
corresponding duty, and it was the explication of duties that was 
equally important–if not more important–than a declaration of 
rights.158 
 
 157. Plaintiff's Application, supra note 45, at 8 (“The trial court and the Court 
of Appeals both reached the factual conclusion that Nestlé’s removal of water 
has caused and will cause substantial harm to the Dead Stream . . . and that 
harm will be even greater at Nestle’s planned increased rate of pumping.”). 
 158. GANDHI, January 13, 1897 – July 11, 1902, in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 477 (“[A] consciousness that we are 
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There are several ways that commentators perceive duty.  
One of the most obvious is in the exercise of restraint to prevent 
encroachment on the rights of others.  In MCWC, for example, 
one can think of a party as having a “right” to use the stream 
water, which implies a duty among others not to interfere with 
the party’s right of use.  On the other hand, one can view “duty” 
in the sense that the rights-holder also holds a duty to others to 
not over-use or abuse his or her right to use the water.  Still 
others view a “duty” to the ecosystem, in the form of a 
responsibility to protect the integrity of the ecosystem itself, 
regardless of whether other human parties are directly and 
adversely affected.159 
In Gandhi’s thought, recognizing rights as universal moral 
declarations is not the central issue as it is in many Western 
conceptions of rights.160  To understand Gandhi’s theory of rights, 
we must examine more deeply the differences between his world-
view and the purely Western world-view.  Gandhi saw the 
realization of Truth, or self-realization, as life’s highest goal.  
Rights, therefore, are relevant to life as opportunities for people 
to further their own realization, not because they were 
“discoveries” of fixed moral universals that support the rights-
holder (and that other parties categorically are duty-bound to 
follow in the purely Western conception). 
Central to Gandhi’s process of self-realization is ahimsa, 
commonly translated as non-violence, non-injury, or non-harm.  
Gandhi described ahimsa as the vehicle, or mechanism, by which 
a person can attain a full realization of Truth (satya).161  Because 
non-injury is central to Gandhi’s conclusion of how Truth must be 
attained, it is self-evident within his system of thought that duty 
becomes more important to clarify than rights.  The manner in 
which we treat others–through the vehicle of non-injury–is 
 
doing what we consider to be our duty to the best of our ability is the highest 
reward.”); see also DASGUPTA, supra note 11, 44-63. 
 159. See ARNE NAESS, ECOLOGY, COMMUNITY AND LIFESTYLE: OUTLINE OF AN 
ECOSOPHY (1989). 
 160. In addition, the power to hold and exercise a “right” does not validate 
itself through rational deduction in Gandhi’s thought. 
 161. See GANDHI, supra note 6, at 463 (“[T]his much I can say with assurance, 
as a result of all my experiments, that a perfect vision of Truth can only follow a 
complete realization of Ahimsa.”). 
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crucial to our own advancement toward self-realization.  Duty, 
therefore, is arguably the most important concept to clarify on the 
path to enlightenment.162  In contrast, the connection between 
rights and duties is not widely discussed in contemporary 
Western social theory of rights, and even in Western law where 
this connection has historically been discussed at length, duty 
takes a back seat to rights in current legal discourse.163 
In MCWC, riparian rights were at issue.  Citizens’ riparian 
right to the Dead Stream was in direct contrast to Nestlé’s 
reasonable use of the groundwater by virtue of its payment of a 
fee to the landowners.  The struggle over Citizens’ riparian rights 
and Nestlé’s “right” to reasonable use became a battle over the 
meaning and application of the terms “on-tract” and “off-tract” 
user.  Citizens argued that its status as “on-tract” users allowed 
its riparian rights to place boundaries around Nestlé’s “off-tract” 
use of the groundwater. 
In standard legal practice, it is common–and necessary–to 
create arguments through the language of law.  Both sides of this 
case funneled their arguments deeply into technical language and 
argued the meanings of that language.  While Citizens argued 
that Nestlé was an “off-tract” user, Nestlé argued they were “on-
tract users.”  A legal formalist may view this argumentative 
process in a generally positive light.  In the process of debating 
the meaning of the law’s language, some formalists may argue 
 
 162. Although the term “enlightenment” can carry several meanings in 
various traditions, we understand Gandhi’s view of self-realization as being 
parallel to Hindu and Buddhist views of moksha and nirvana, respectively.  
Regardless of the conception of enlightenment, it is important to note that for 
Gandhi, the fulfillment of “individual” self-realization and a more enlightened 
social world went hand-in-hand; effectively, one necessarily followed from the 
other. 
  Gandhi is credited with saying, “The difference between what we do and 
what we are capable of doing would suffice to solve most of the world’s 
problems.”  Gandhi connected individual duty and social good through cause and 
effect, explaining that if we all attend to our duties, then peace and a better 
world will follow. DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 59 (“By exercising their rights 
individuals are enabled to develop their own potential to the full and by doing so 
contribute as best they can to the common good which it is their duty to do.”). 
 163. Incidentally, Dasgupta notes that law is the field of Gandhi’s formal 
training, which perhaps explains why he focused his attention on duty. 
DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 53. 
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that the law’s “deeper meanings” can be brought to light.164  In 
this way of thinking, legal reasoning has the potential to unearth 
profound themes embedded in the concepts of the law.  However, 
environmental law is especially wrought with technicalities so 
detailed that it requires the input of scientists and engineers.  
Even when viewed in a formalistic manner, it is difficult to see 
how arguing the meaning of legal terms unearths any hidden 
“deeper meanings” in the law.  In MCWC, the legal arguments 
analyzed the detail (even minutiae) of the language that 
regulates property use.  Rather than unearthing “deeper 
meanings” in the law, judges and lawyers focused on details that 
impeded a discussion of the broader themes the case presented.  
This case, like cases generally, became a battle over rights in 
which the victorious party more successfully wove their rights 
into the law’s language. 
If one applies Gandhi’s theory of rights, one of the glaring 
omissions in this case is the absence of any discussion of duty.  
Under a duty-based theory of rights, a central question for the 
court would be what reciprocal duties both parties have to one 
another, and also what duties each party has to the environment.  
Perhaps the strongest argument under this theory of rights lies 
with Citizens: Nestlé owes a duty to use the water only in ways 
that do not interfere with the riparian owners’ uses of the Dead 
Stream.  If Nestlé’s use interferes with riparian uses, then Nestlé 
is not honoring its duty not to interfere with riparian uses.  
Nestlé may also counter-argue that riparian owners may not 
interfere with the corporation’s use of the groundwater; however, 
other than the filing of the lawsuit itself, there is no evidence that 
riparian owners interfered with Nestlé’s use of the water. 
In a duty-based theory of rights, the duty to the environment 
is a preexisting obligation for the right to use the land.165  In 
 
 164. Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 81 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005); see 
also Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251 
(1975).  For a critique of formalism, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW (1963); see also JOHN R. SUTTON, LAW/SOCIETY: ORIGINS, INTERACTIONS, AND 
CHANGE 137-42 (2001). 
 165. This construction of the relationship between duties and rights would be 
central to a mindful jurisprudence of the environment that incorporates 
Gandhi’s thought. 
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MCWC, there is no evidence of the riparian owner’s over-use of 
the Dead Stream.  In contrast, there is ample concern of Nestlé’s 
over-use of the groundwater and its effect on the ecosystem.  The 
trial court and court of appeals noted that Nestlé’s pumping 
would cause “substantial harm to the dead stream”166 and also 
the contiguous ecosystem.167 
Therefore, in Gandhi’s theory of rights, there are heavy 
burdens on Nestlé.  Although the trial court ruled that riparian 
rights outweighed Nestlé’s reasonable use, the dictum and the 
briefs themselves contain an exclusive language of rights in 
which the parties’ “rights” to “use” the water are placed in direct 
competition with one another.  In this highly individualistic 
design of law, the self-interest involved in protecting rights at the 
expense of others’ rights dominates the legal discourse.  The 
highly adversarial design of legal argumentation itself virtually 
eliminated any opportunity to discuss duties in this case, and the 
lawyers and judges seemed stuck in a discourse in which self-
interest is the “normal” foundation of legal reasoning.  It is no 
surprise, then, that parties argue their “rights” over the rights of 
the opponent, and judges view the proper method of analyzing 
rights purely in competitive and self-interested terms.  As a 
result, balancing tests require comparing rights, with no 
assessment of duties. 
In Gandhi’s thought, duties matter in legal analysis because 
of its focus on responsibilities to others as a basis for peaceful 
social relations.  This “other-regarding” way of thinking is 
disregarded in modern American jurisprudence for a “self-
regarding” disposition, which we believe the MCWC case palpably 
illustrates.168 
 
 166. See Plaintiff's Application, supra note 45, at 8 (“The trial court and the 
Court of Appeals both reached the factual conclusion that Nestlé’s removal of 
water has caused and will cause substantial harm to the Dead Stream . . .  and 
that harm will be even greater at Nestlé’s planned increased rate of pumping.”). 
 167. Id. 
 168. For a discussion of “self-regarding” versus “other-regarding” behavior, see 
DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 32. 
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D.   Connecting “Ecosystem Nexus” Theory to Gandhi’s 
 Critique of Industrialization 
In a narrow legal sense, this dispute involves the plaintiff’s 
riparian right to the reasonable use of the Dead Stream versus 
Nestlé’s right to the reasonable use of groundwater from the land 
it owns in fee simple.169  In a broader view, this case also 
represents the struggles to either foster or contain industrial 
development of pristine ecosystems, and in MCWC, the court 
invoked the “ecosystem nexus theory” to determine the proper 
balance between ecological preservation and industrial growth.  
Gandhi left behind extensive commentary on the social 
consequences of industrialization, and therefore, his thought has 
much to contribute to understanding the implications of MCWC. 
Evidence of Gandhi’s skepticism of modern industrialization 
is legion.  As the British Empire pushed to industrialize its 
production processes, Gandhi warned against India following the 
Empire’s lead.  Commentators often interpreted his arguments 
against industrialization in India as being based on moral 
grounds.  At times, his arguments were specific to India’s 
national context in the twentieth century, and at other times, 
Gandhi made broader sociological points that form a more 
categorical rejection of industrialization.  It is the latter which we 
focus on here. 
Gandhi made two arguments against industrialization that 
we will apply to MCWC.  The first argument is that 
industrialization, due to its heavy reliance on machinery, replaces 
human labor rather than aiding it.  Second, once industrialization 
takes hold of an area, there is no limit to its encroachment.170 
First, Gandhi argued that industrialization did not lead to 
higher employment.171  Although many industrialists of his time 
made the argument that machinery would create jobs, Gandhi 
saw the trend in the opposite direction.  Instead, machines 
 
 169. Nestlé further argued they are considered riparian users and not just 
groundwater users because Nestlé purchased part of the land from the 
Bollmans’. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 186 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 170. For a discussion of these two arguments, see DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 
71-76. 
 171. Mahatma Ghandi, Remarks to Manu Gandhi (Apr. 21, 1947), in 
DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 71. 
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replaced human labor and provided no guarantee of replacing 
people’s jobs.  Work increasingly done by machines meant less 
work available for humans.  In MCWC, Nestlé built a plant solely 
to extract water from the watershed.  The inclusion of this 
machinery into the area served no purpose but to accelerate 
Nestlé’s water extraction and did not include any conceivable job 
creation for local populations.  Nestlé’s interest in implementing 
the machinery into the watershed is so explicitly void of any local 
benefit that the corporation itself did not even attempt to make 
any such job-creation-based argument. 
Second, Gandhi’s concern of machinery’s encroachment into 
society parallels Citizens’ concern of machinery’s encroachment 
into the ecosystem.  Gandhi especially condemned modern 
industrial processes largely because of the manner in which they 
concentrated wealth and power into the hands of elite oppressors.  
He says “[o]rganization of machinery for the purposes of 
concentrating wealth and power in the hands of a few and for the 
exploitation of the many I would hold to be altogether wrong.  
Much of the organization of machinery of the present age is of 
that type.”172 
Nestlé’s unprecedented ability to remove 150 gallons of water 
per minute and 37.5% of the well’s total capacity173 from the 
Dead Stream watershed presents a clear use of machinery used to 
concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a few.  With the 
unparalleled ability to take water at such excessive rates, Nestlé 
exercises the power to take and sell a resource necessary to the 
integrity of the region for the purposes of expanding its own 
market share.  To take water to the point where the very 
character of the ecosystem is jeopardized, furthermore, raises the 
issue of exploitation of not only other riparian owners, but also of 
the ecosystem itself and all human and non-human biotic life 
depending on it. 
 
 172. Mahatma Ghandi, Remarks to “American friends” (Sept. 17, 1925), in 
DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 73. 
 173. Plaintiff's Application, supra note 45, at 4-5.  The full capacity of the well 
is 400 gallons of water per minute, 500,000 gallons per day, and 210 million 
gallons per year. Id. at 2.  The court reasoned that even at 37.5% capacity, 
Nestlé’s pumping was unreasonable.  Therefore, 100% capacity could result in 
devastating ecosystemic consequences. Id. at 4-5. 
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In MCWC, perhaps the most important check on exploitation 
of a natural resource by an outside entity is the test that 
determines “on-tract” vs. “off-tract” users.  The reasonable use 
doctrine contains a “fair participation” test that takes into 
account whether the water being withdrawn is used on-tract or 
off-tract.174  The court of appeals cited Schenk v. City of Ann 
Arbor, in which there was a dispute between an on-tract user of 
groundwater and a city that planned to pump groundwater off-
tract to meet municipal needs.175  The court uses the idea of 
“material diminishment” in reasonable use, which means an off-
tract user could not cause an interference with an on-tract use.176  
Schenk drew a distinction between on-tract and off-tract users, 
which directly relates to reasonable use.177  By expecting users to 
have an on-tract presence, the court implicitly provides a check 
on industry’s encroachment onto–and potential exploitation of–
the environment and other users.  Consequently, the court 
connects the concern of preserving the “ecosystem nexus” with 
the notion of fair participation, thus making the notion of fairness 
and Gandhi’s concern of machinery’s encroachment on the 
environment relevant to justifying further industrial development 
of an ecosystem. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Gandhi’s life and thought has deeply influenced millions of 
people around the world, particularly regarding the struggles of 
the oppressed and struggles to achieve social justice.  His thought 
has especially been used to achieve social change through civil 
disobedience, peace, and non-violence.  Moreover, Gandhi’s 
thought has been used to develop practical applications of 
“alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) because many lawyers see 
the resolution of conflict as one of law’s primary functions.  
However, Gandhi’s thought has been lost to those who theorize 
about jurisprudence.  We argue that Gandhi’s thought contains 
an intricate and comprehensive social theory that should inform 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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jurisprudence.  This paper is our speculation on how Gandhi’s 
thought connects to American environmental jurisprudence. 
Modern law is often criticized for its narrow application of 
specific legal principles at the expense of larger social 
considerations.178  Especially in environmental law, court 
decisions and legal briefs often dwell on technical details about 
chemical concentrations or what constitutes a “discharge” of an 
effluent.  When dwelling on detail, it is easy for courts to stray 
from the law’s broader initiatives and leave unaddressed the 
central issues that exercise environmental policy, such as how to 
conceptualize property rights and duties, conservation, and 
beneficial versus consumptive use. 
In MCWC, the parties invoke several key concepts of law, 
including the Public Trust Doctrine, Reasonable Use Doctrine, 
significant public interest, riparian rights, and ecosystem nexus.  
We have examined these concepts as they may appear when one 
considers relevant ideas from Gandhi’s thought–in particular his 
theory of trusteeship, his theory of rights, sarvodaya, and his 
critique of industrialization.  In the process of invoking Gandhi’s 
thought, we illustrate the inefficacy of certain arguments that are 
otherwise viable under purely “western-based” approaches to the 
same legal concepts.  We believe that by examining the law from 
this alternative perspective, we can provide a unique view of the 
fundamental principles of environmental law and develop a 
jurisprudence more mindful of encouraging responsibility (duties 
of the wealthy as trustees), non-injury (ahimsa as a basis for 
reasonable use and minimizing industrialization’s encroachment 
on the environment), and overall welfare (sarvodaya).  Gandhi’s 
thought on these issues helps us speculate on what a 
jurisprudence would look like that treats these principles as 
meaningful social goals.  We call such a legal theory a “mindful 
jurisprudence.” 
In this more mindful jurisprudence, the overuse of natural 
resources is not only the state’s responsibility to monitor; it is the 
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responsibility of all, especially those with the most wealth.  
Because corporations are the wealthiest “people” in modern 
societies, it would be an expectation that corporate use of wealth 
must be guided by the view that their money is held in trust for 
society’s benefit.  Furthermore, rather than the equalization of 
wealth being the only issue of social debate, the question of how 
wealth is used would be a central question.  A mindful 
jurisprudence would demand that corporations function as 
society’s most important stewards, and valid legal arguments 
would require corporate behavior in the welfare of all, not merely 
the greatest number of people. 
Furthermore, in a mindful jurisprudence, any discussion of 
rights would begin with a question of what duty is owed.  In 
MCWC, both parties’ legal briefs immediately begin with 
arguments for how one group’s rights outweigh the other group’s 
rights.  In a mindful jurisprudence, the main question for both 
parties is what duty they owe to each other, or how their use will 
not interfere with the other’s use.  In this case, that question 
applies entirely to Nestlé.  The central burden for Nestlé is to 
show how its right to use the water does not interfere with the 
riparian owner’s use of the same resource.  The courts already 
seem to arrive at this line of reasoning and expect the parties to 
fulfill the same duty that Gandhi’s thought would require.  
However, to extend Gandhi’s theory of rights farther, a mindful 
jurisprudence would contain within it the expectation that Nestlé 
also must focus its attention on its duty to the ecosystem in order 
to create a successful argument for its own “right” to use the 
water. 
A preoccupation with “rights” without a well-developed 
consideration of duty can become purely self-regarding and easily 
disregard the needs of others, whereas a focus on duty is an easy 
consequence of the “other-regarding” thought that is mindful of 
the needs of others.  In Gandhi’s thought, duty is central to rights 
and the most important concept in any discussion of “rights” 
because the way we regard others is crucial to our own self-
realization.  According to Gandhi, moksha–life’s highest goal in 
most branches of Indian philosophy–can only be achieved through 
ahimsa.  Therefore, ahimsa is not only a primary policy of law; 
rather, it is the mechanism to attain a more enlightened way of 
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living and situates legal thought into a world-view based on non-
injury. 
Finally, a mindful jurisprudence would require the debate 
about reasonable use to invoke sarvodaya rather than 
utilitarianism.  The court seriously entertains Nestlé’s utilitarian 
argument even though Nestlé presents no plan to uplift the 
riparian owners along with its own profit.  In a mindful 
jurisprudence, it would be implicit that Nestlé must show how its 
water extraction uplifts the welfare of all–including the welfare of 
the riparian owners.  The fact that this perspective is non-
existent in the case only underscores the need for an alternative 
to utilitarian reasoning. 
Our contemporary environmental discourse is full of many 
cries that the earth is dying.  Whether we examine the dire 
consequences from climate change, pollution, or biodiversity loss, 
it is clear that revolutionary new thinking is needed to 
immediately combat the perils of modern environmental 
problems.  Gandhi is one of the twentieth century’s most 
recognizable critics of modern development, and his critique of 
the modern notion of “progress” is as important now as it ever has 
been.  Gandhi’s thought contains the promise of an invigorating 
discussion on the problems that ail us and the planet.  Whether 
our legal community listens–and whether jurisprudence will meet 
modern environmental challenges–is not a question that time will 
permit. 
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